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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEMAR S. WINEGAR and
LEGRAND WINEGAR,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

vs.
SMITH INVESTMENT COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and
Respondent.

Case

REPLY BRIEF OF
Appeal from a Judgment
Of the Third Judicial Di
Of Salt Lake County, Utah~ ',
Honorable Peter L. Le•rf'• · ·

Harry o. Pugsley
310 South Main Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

•ttorney for
· . Defendant and Respondent
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POINT I
THE FACT THAT THE WINEGARS RECEIVED THE
LEASE BY AN ASSIGNMENT DOES NOT
CURE TIIE AMBIGUITY CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT
The major thrust of defendant's fourth point in its
brief is that the ambiguity in the lease is cured by the
assignment of the amended lease from the Doxeys to the
winegars.

A review of the proceedings in the trial court

clearly shows that the decision of the trial judge is
primarily influenced by the court's concern that the assignment of the lease should now preclude the existence of
an ambiguous term in the agreement.

At page 243 of the

record the trial judge stated:
--my question goes No. 1, you're
claiming that there's an ambiguity,
and it's between the parties, and
that needs to be straightened around.
Well, the parties to the amendment
were Mr. Doxey and Smith Investment
Company.
The people that came in
subsequently were not parties to
the amendment.
They took an assignment
of the lease.
If they take an
assignment of the lease, don't they
take subject to whatever the terms
and conditions of that lease are?
And if so, if they have read the
lease, then where is there any
ambiguity between the parties?
After all, the--really the assignees
are not parties to the lease in
the sense that you're talking about.
They're taking an interest of someone
else under the terms of the lease.
Now, how do you get the ambiguity
down to the plaintiff?
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The trial court

was not justified in relying upon

the assignment of the lease as being an exception to the
rule that a court must properly construe an ambiguous
provision of a lease.

In its brief, the defendant fails

to cite any legal authority for such " pos:i tion.

i\ftor

deligent research, the plaintiffs assert thctt there is
none.
Case law is frequently cited to the effect that
an assignee has no greater rights than his assignor.
See Pierce vs. Ackerman, 488 P.2d 1118 (Colo. App. 1971).
The converse of this statement is the controlling rule
that pinpoints the error of the trial court and entitles
plaintiffs to a reversal of the ruling of the trial court
on the question of the ambiguity of the lease.
If the assignor had no greater right than the
assignee, then an assignee would be entitled to compel
a court of law to construe an ambiguous lease provision
just as his assignor would have had such right.

Plaintiffs

submit that an assignee steps into the shoes of his assirrnor
and is entitled to bring an action to compel the proper
construction of an ambiguous lease.
Numerous cases recite the rule that the assignee
"steps into the shoes" of his assignor.
vs.

Radio

See -------Lundstrom

Corporation of America, 405 P.2d 339, 341,

17 Utah 2d 114

(1965), and PaulJ:sis

130, 135, 59 Wash. 2d 204

(1961).

v~__i:'ow_1_(3_E,

By such

d

<67P.2cl
~
stcttement
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it cannot be inferred that the assigrce, in any way, losses
i\

sing] e riglit which wcis previous!; held by the cissignor.
The pluintiffs' position is supported by the case

of Mobile Acres, Inc. vs. Kurata,
503 P.2d 889
-·
---~-------------------------------

(Kan. 1973),

which case is practically identical to the matter now
before this Court.

In

__!'-_s,:_!·cs_,

~?l?ll_<::

the defendant entered

into a lease agreement with Messrs. Hill and Webster,
who subsequently assigned the lease to the plaintiff,
Mobile Hornes, Inc.
These arrangements were completely satisfactory
until an assessment of property taxes against the defendant
and improvement taxes against the plaintiff gave rise
to a dispute regarding the meaning of a provision of the
lease relative to the payment of taxes.

The Supreme Court

of Kansas ruled, as a matter of law, that the lease was
ambiguous as between the defendant-lessor and the plaintiffassignee and the Court remanded the matter to the trial
court for the development of evidence as to the proper
construction of the lease.
As in the Mobil Acres case, the \>ilinegars, as
assignees of the lease, are entitled to obtain a proper
construction of their ambiguous lease with the defendant.
The ambiguity in the lease is not cured by the assignment.
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THIS COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER
COURT REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR REFORMATION OR
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR PROPER CONSTRUCTION
OF THE AMBIGUOUS LF.l1SE.
On page 22 of its brief,

the defendant refers

to the findings of fact of the trial court and states
that plaintiffs' claim of ambiguity and claim for :::<C'formati",
are both negated by such findings.

Defendant then conclucie'

its sixth point by citing language of a case relative
This Coun,

to the standard of review by appellate courts.
however,

is free to consider both the facts and the law

in this matter.
A suit for reformation is in equity.
Remedies, p.
491

752, and

(Cal. App. 1959).

Me~tler

vs~Hed]-y,

See Dobbs,

338 P.2d 489,

In equitable proceedings it is

clear that the Utah Supreme Court sits in review of the
facts, as well as the law.
552 P.2d 136

Salt Lake County vs. Kartchner,

(Utah 1976).

As to their petition for reformation, plaintiffs'
submit that there is a mutual mistake of fact.

'fhis asser-

tion is born out by the testimony of the parties.
Mr.

Doxey, who executed the amendment to the lease,

testified that there was no question about the fact that;
"the lease was extended and included in that
extension was the fact that the renewal
would be extended as well."
(R. 148-149)
M.r.

Smith's testimony for the defendant, or rather

the lack of it, clearly shows that the true intention

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

of the parties was to establish a three month notice of
renewal.

Mr. Smith's testimony is quoted on page 15 of

the defendunt's brief and is found at page 255 of the
record.
This testimony deals solely with the extension
of the lease from an eight year to a ten year term.

No

discussion or negotiation as to the renewal provision
is mentioned.

In the absence of any discussion or negotia-

tion as to the time for the giving of the notice of renewal,
the only meeting of the minds that was obtained by the
parties on the question of notice is that such notice
must be given within three months.
Defendant argues in its brief that because the
defendant owned the entire adjacent shopping center, it
was important for the defendant to know about a termination
of the lease more than two years before the termination was
to take place.

This argument is belied by the fact that,

on the day that Mr. Smith met with Mr. Doxey to sign the
amendment to the lease, Mr. Smith offered to Mr. Doxey
a lease which was prepared by the defendant and which
contained a notice of renewal provision merely requiring
a three month notice.

Only after specific negotiation

on the issue of the length of the term was Mr. Doxey able
to oblain a ten year term.

No discussion or negotiation

-s-
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as to the timing of the giving of notice to renew was
had, and no change was made in the meeting of the minds
of the parties on the issue of notice.
The only reasonable conclusion that can be made
is that both parties, as a matter of mutual mistake, overlooked the provision relating to notice of renewal, and
the parties failed to discuss, negotiate, or amend the
three month notice provision.

The notice provision

should remain, therefore, a provision for a three month
notice of renewal in order to conform to the understanding
of the parties.
At no time did the defendant ask for, or obtain
a notice provision of more than three months.

By a reforma·

tion of the amendment to the lease, the Court can establis:1
the true agreement of the parties.
Separate and distinct from

plaintiff~

claim for

reformation is the fact that the amendment to the lease
is ambiguous and requires construction by the Court. Whereas
reformation is an equitable matter, the construction of
a contract is a matter determined by an action at law.
In the case now before the court, the plaintiffs are entitled
to a renewal of the lease for an additional five year
term on either or both of these theories.
In considering the construction of the amended
lease, this court is again not bound by the findings of
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the trictl court.
551 P.2d 932, 933-4

(Colo. App. 1973), the

Colorado Court of Appeals held thctt
[t]he construction of a written instrument
such as the agreement before us is
a question of law; therefore, we are
not bound by the finding of the trial
court in this regard (citation omitted).
1-lumerous cases cite similar language and support
the plaintiffs position.

Particularly enlightening is

the recent case of Iskres vs. Owens, 561 P.2d 1218, 1222
(Alaska 1977).

In this case the Supreme Court of Alaska

construed the provisions of a lease and stated that:
[i]n analyzing this agreement, our standard
of appellate review is that which we
articulated in Day vs. A & G Construction
Company, Inc., 528 P.2d 440, 448 (Alaska
1974). There we stated that the interpretation of words is a matter for the
court, while resolution of a dispute
is to the surrounding circumstances is
for the trier of facts.
Questions pertaining to the meaning to be given to
the words of the contract are to be con-.
sidered in the same manner as questions
of law.
Consequently, this court, in
interpreting the words of a contract,
is not bound by the lower court's views,
and the "clearly erroneous" standard
used in reviewing a trial court's
factual findings is inapplicable.
After it is determined that a lease agreement
is ambiguous, and in construing its terms, the appeals
court generally must review factual circumstances aiding
its construction of the lease.

In such a case the court

is faced with mixed questions of fact and law and the
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same standard of review is applicable.

The appr~ctls court

in the case of §~huld_<:~-\7~_._~!ub_!?~_l_c:l_i_l_1_g_, 489 P.2d 122'l,
1931-2, 15 Ariz. App. 527 (1971), in construing

i1

lease

held that:
The construction of a written agreement
involves questions of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law, neither of
which are binding on this court on review.
(Other citations ommitted, but
see Waldorf vs. Elliott, 330 P.2d 355,
357 (1958).

CONCLUSION
The ambiguity of the lease provision regarding
the giving of notice of renewal, is discussed in the first
point of the Brief of Plaintiffs - Appellants and will
not be reiterated here.

Plaintiffs refer to the foregoing

arguments and to the argument in their first brief to
substantiate the fact that the parol evidence relating
to the execution of the lease amendment, and the practical
construction of the lease in light of the actions of the
parties, clearly indicate that the trial court erred in
failing to grant the plaintiffs a renewal of five years
on their lease.
In conjunction with a holding establishing the
proper construction of the lease or, in the alternative,
that the plaintiffs are entitled to a reformation of the
lease to establish the true agreement of the parties,
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--the plaintiffs are entitled to the other relief sought
on appeal as set forth in the Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Respectfully submitted this

K_~

day of November,

1978.

~~~~
~~~A
])
--

~f_.l)~
BRUCE LAVAR DIBB

I hereby certify that I hand delivered, two copies
of the foregoing to Harry Pugsley, Attorney for the Defendant,
Suite 1200, South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101,

this __j_~_ day of November, 19 78.
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